SUMMARY. Body weight has risen in defiance of health and appearance norms. This is framed in terms of the problem of time-inconsistency and self-control. The social epidemics of overeating and slimming were driven by market forces and the psychology of eating: restrained eating was easily disinhibited by the stresses of new rewards. For men, the rise in body weight was associated with the decline of family eating and exposure to greater food variety. For women, the 'cult of slimming' was associated with mating and workplace competition, driven initially by adverse sex ratios. Food abundance made it difficult for rational consumers to conform with social norms.
Green's dilemma is a challenge to this point of view. In her Diary of a Fat Housewife, she wrote, 'I'm starting my diet, tomorrow, that's right/so let's have that last bite of pizza tonight!' But, for many years, tomorrow never came. Like millions of others, despite her best efforts, her weight would not go down. This study assumes that consumers may find it difficult to achieve their objectives. This may help to explain how cultural attitudes were formed. Moving from the individual to society as a whole, the rise of body weight demonstrates how affluence can rise, and yet fail to deliver well-being.
The social norms of body weight have reflected two concerns: health and personal attractiveness. Since the 1950s, both appearance and health norms for body weight have been going down. The standard height-adjusted measure is the Body Mass Index (BMI), calculated as weight (kg)/height squared (m 2 ). The World Health Organization defines 'overweight' as starting at a BMI of 25 for women and men, and for all ages, with 'obesity' at BMI 30 and above. American agencies, which had previously used higher thresholds, have recently accepted this norm. 7 Large longitudinal studies in the USA indicated that obesity (BMI > 30) doubled mortality risk. 8 Obesity is associated with increased risks of gallbladder diseases, diabetes, heart disease and hypertension, of eightfold, sixfold, threefold, and one-half respectively. 9 That mild overweight is harmful has been disputed, 10 but recent work shows that it is not benign. In a British study of 7,735 men aged 40-59, ' [the] risk of cardiovascular death, heart attack, and diabetes increased progressively from an index of <20 even after age, smoking, social class, alcohol consumption, and physical activity were adjusted for'.
11 Similar findings were obtained for American women, aged 30-55, on a larger sample. The conventions of personal attractiveness have also lowered weight norms. In personal interaction, the overweight were held in low regard, and found it more difficult to make and keep friends and spouses. Attractive persons had better prospects in education and at work, and were more likely to elicit co-operation. 13 Weight norms have followed a long cycle. A long-term record of these norms is provided by the measurement of photographs of models in women's magazines. The bust-to-waist ratios in Ladies Home Journal and Vogue declined from the turn of the century to a minimum in the 1920s, when weight-reduction first came into vogue. They rose to another peak in the late 1940s, a lower peak in the early 1960s, and a particularly sharp decline into the 1980s.
14 Playboy centrefolds and Miss America contestants in the 1960s and 1970s fell substantially below normative weights. 15 Such norms were beyond the reach of most women. Feminist writers decried them as oppressive, in titles like Never too Thin, Unbearable Weight, Am I Thin Enough Yet?, The Beauty Myth and Tl\e Tyranny ofSlenderness} 6 Real consumer spending per head more than doubled in the USA and Britain between 1950 and . 17 In contrast, spending on food, alcohol, and tobacco has risen only about one-fifth in the UK, and one-quarter in the United States. 18 In spite of the lag in food consumption, body weights continued to rise while weight norms were going down ( Figure 1) . From around the turn of the century, average body weights rose about two BMI units, and may have already reached their 1980 levels in Britain in the 1930s, but were still within the 'optimal' range. Similar magnitudes of increase occurred in the United States, c. under affluence, mean BMI has been moving upwards: American men were already over the BMI health limit of 25 in the early 1960s, and rose to 26.5 thirty years later. American white women had lower BMIs, British men and women were lighter still, but average weights were converging upwards, women on men, and Britons on Americans. By the 1990s they were all well above the 'overweight' threshold of 25 BMI (Figure 1) . Part of the rise can be attributed to ageing, but health-related weight norms are not adjusted for age, and similar rises are retorded within age groups. 21 It was more significant that obesity (BMI > 30) was described as expanding sharply. Taking proportions rather than averages, from the 1970s to the 1990s the incidence of'overweight' in the USA rose from 51 to 59 per cent for men, from 41 to 50 per cent for women, with Britain behind but catching up. 'Obesity' (BMI > 30) more than doubled in Britain to a level of 15-17 per cent, while of American men about one-fifth were defined as obese, and one-quarter of women.
22 This is commonly referred to as an 'epidemic', which may be appropriate in view of the health consequences.
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Body weight is regulated individually by the relationship between food intake and energy expenditure. The mismatch between weight aspirations and outcomes can be regarded as a problem of self-control. Self-control entails the sacrifice of some immediate reward for the prospect of a superior one. For Norbert Elias, the 'civilizing process' is the rise of self-control over historical time, exemplified in the evolution of table manners, in which the common bowl and greasy fingers gave way to a structured meal. 24 Pierre Bourdieu found a contrast between the coarseness of working-class eating habits in 1960s France and the restrained and decorous format of middle-class eating. 25 Both of these were progressive narratives, which linked a rise in affluence to increasing self-control. What they did not anticipate was that self-control might decline with abundance, nor did they anticipate the fragmenta- 21 In Britain, National Food Survey households increased in age from an average 34.1 to 36.6 between 1974-6 and 1992-4. An increase of this magnitude would raise BMI by 0.6-0.8 units, whereas the actual increase was more than twice as large. See A. Chesher, 'Diet Revealed? Semiparametric Estimation of Nutrient Intake-Age Relationships', unpublished paper, University of Bristol, (February 1996) For weights to rise, it was necessary for people to prefer the immediate gratifications of eating, to the delayed ones of normative appearance. It is normal (though not always rational) to discount the future. 27 But when people make choices that imply adverse consequences which they can foresee, and would not have made from a more detached or dispassionate perspective, their choice is described as 'time-inconsistent'. Such choices have long puzzled social scientists, as contradicting the assumptions of rational choice. 29 They are sufficiently common to have motivated several explanatory approaches. 30 In the rational choice approach there is no such thing as 'overweight'. People gain weight because the benefits outweigh the costs. 31 But, if consumers (such as Mrs Green) are making a sustained effort to undo their prior decisions, that suggests that they regret the initial choice, and that compelling, but inferior, preferences pose a genuine difficulty. An alternative approach (widely observed in animal and human behaviour) suggests that discounting of future rewards is often not exponential but hyperbolic: rewards become more attractive as they approach in time, to a point where the ranking of preferences is reversed, so that an inferior reward now dominates a superior one in the future. 32 The prior choice may be described as 'myopic'. 33 The concept of myopia implies that one can do better by resisting a reward. Selfcontrol, or prudence, the ability to defer gratification, thus becomes an attribute of rationality. The resources and strategies mobilized for self-control are individual and cognitive, involving knowledge, willpower, and personal rules and behavioural 'bright lines'. They also draw for support on social resources such as reputation, interpersonal pledges, contracts, norms, rules, and regulation.
The strategies of self-control, both cognitive and social, take time to develop and acquire. 34 When they persist, they form durable clusters of'culture'. If self-control is costly, then the well-off have better access to it than the poor. 33 Partly or wholly, this is because the poor have fewer realistic prospects of delayed rewards to look forward to. But self-control has not necessarily increased when society became more affluent as a whole. Our hypothesis is that myopic choice accounts for the reversal of the historical trend towards greater self-control. The post-war period of rapid economic growth was one in which the bulk of the population was finally released from the shadow of indigence. Food prices, which in earlier times had dominated manual incomes, fell sharply as a proportion of income, while supply increased greatly in variety. 36 Affluence may be characterized as a flow of new and inexpensive rewards. If these rewards arrive faster than the disciplines of prudence can form, then self-control will decline with affluence: the affluent (with everyone else) will become less prudent. Self-control strategies take time and effort to devise and to learn. Under the impact of affluence, they become obsolete.
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What caused body weights to rise was the impact of food availability on existing prudential strategies, interacting with the psychology of food consumption, and the decline in physical activity. Food availability was driven by supply competition. In the 1950s in Britain and America, most eating took place at home on the fixed occasions of three or four set meals. Housewives toiled long over 'the regular unimaginative English meal-meat, potatoes and, sometimes, "greens", followed by pudding and helped down by a final cup of coffee or tea'. 37 In the 1950s, six out of every ten men took their main meal mid-day and at home. 'To be on the roads in any populated part of the country around mid-day is to see clouds of cyclists and motor cyclists who bear witness to this homeward trek.' 38 American practice was similar. In the early 1950s, the core meal was made up of meat, starch (potatoes, corn, rice), and vegetables, but served more usually in the evening; of the ethnic minority cuisines, only the Italian made much headway, with spaghetti and tomato sauce. 42 Cautiously, eaters also began to move beyond home cooking in search of variety and convenience. 43 In the 1950s, a fifth of British breakfasts included Americantype cereals. 44 French haute cuisine had long provided the model for upper-class cooking. 45 Elizabeth David's celebrated recipes introduced Mediterranean rustic flavours and 'slow food', with fresh ingredients, careful preparation, and a relaxed experience of eating. A similar nouvelle cuisine appeared in the United States. 46 For those in a hurry, the freezer and chilled sections of the shops carried ready-made food, building on the fish-fingers and frozen peas of the 1950s. 47 At home, microwave ovens, introduced in 1973, reached 50 per cent of American households by 1985. 48 Fridges and freezers made shopping easier. 49 A 1984 British survey found 'convenience' food to account for more than a third of all food outlays.
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In Britain, convenience and novelty beckoned in ethnic restaurants and takeaways, Chinese, Indian, Italian and Cypriot, and pizza parlours, burger bars and fried chicken outlets inspired or franchized from the USA. Still greater culinary variety diffused through the United States, reinforced by an abundance of themed cookbooks. 51 Exotic cuisines entered the domestic cycle as sources of variety and spice, although not yet as staples. 52 the United States ( Figure 2 ). The appeal was convivial as well as culinary.' 4 This is attested by the elasticity of'eating out' on consumption expenditure, which was 0.93 in America and 0.76 in Britain, i.e. rising much closer in line with consumer expenditures than food outlays. outlays between 1963 and 1993. 56 Portions also grew, and the conception of a 'normal' helping has moved upwards. 57 McDonald's biggest hamburger inflated from 3.7 ounces to almost nine. 58 In a British market survey (1986), three-quarters of adults bought take-away food once a month, rising from about half in 1972. Most readily available were the sweet and salty, energy-heavy, snack or junk' foods: crisps, chocolate bars, nuts, cookies, soft drinks, etc. 'The most heavily advertised foods tend to be of dubious nutritional value', and are heavily promoted to children. 60 Defining snacking as 'the consumption of food in-hand, without the use of domestic cutlery or crockery . . . and involving minimal or no immediate preparation', in 1987 in Britain, 'snack foods represent 34 per cent of all food purchases, and snack foods together with all other foods eaten as snacks account for 44 per cent of the total food market'. 61 Adding non-alcoholic drinks would bring the outlay on snacking very close to 50 per cent. 62 There is a puzzle about food intake. Household food surveys showed intake in decline, even as body weights were rising. But the British National Food Survey omitted alcohol, confectionery and soft drinks, as well as eating out. A different, top-down, approach is to measure 'disappearance', that is, how much food enters the food chain. This incorporates some waste, but is a better guide to trends. Taking this measure, from 1961/4 to 1988/94 calorie intake per capita in the USA increased 22 per cent. 65 Americans consumed about as many calories as Britons in the 1950s, but surged ahead in the 1970s, and again in the 1980s. Britons only followed after 1979 ( Figure 3 ). American calorie intake was quite highly correlated with income per head over time (r = 0.87), with British consumption much less so (r = 0.39). I k c l i n e in physical activity is a residudl cxplanatlon for the rise In body \veight. though there is little research."' Bodily exertlon \vork has declined ~v i t h rnanual einployn~cnt. Britain motorized later than the United State3. which may help to explain why American) \verc he'ivier than l3ritons on the same amount o f c ,~l o r i~s In the 196( h."" T h e fragilentatior~ o f d n~l l i n g , \ h o p p~n g , and work has requirtd more travel by car. It was a far cry from the world 111 which most men walked or cycled home for lunch. T h e physical activit). that \vas once a part ofdally life n o w hdd t o be pdid for w~t h dcsiglated time, space. equipment. and advice. But, \ v h~t -ever the contribution o f the decline in phy\ical exercise, people have been eatlrlg If food availability was the supply shock, on the demand side, the response was mediated by the psychology of satiation. Body weight responds to several different feedback loops, which are difficult to monitor and to control. It usually follows a slight rising trend over the life cycle without varying a great deal, but equilibrium is often well off target. The choice of what to eat and when to stop can be regarded as being either rational or myopic. 70 Animal foraging in the wild, and huntergathering societies, are modelled in terms of'optimal foraging', the rational quest for maximum energy at minimal effort. But the 'thrifty genotype', selected by evolution under scarcity, becomes maladaptive under affluence, and impels people to overeat. An 'efficient' converter of food into fat can put on twice as much weight as an 'inefficient' one, with the same intake.
72 Metabolic efficiency is a genetic endowment, and overweight has a genetic component. 73 There is a view that the body maintains a homeostatic balance that 'defends' a 'set-point' body weight. If weight falls below this level, the body will motivate weight gain. 74 One approach to appetite concentrates on the 'normal' physiological cycle: an empty stomach signals hunger, the subject responds by eating, and a full stomach makes him stop. The feedback is self-contained and physiological, but the cycle is complex and poorly understood.
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Once people attempt to restrain eating before satiation, they are easily disinhibited into excess eating. The trigger is external stress, which comes in three forms: appetizing food; negative feelings; and the company of other people. Again, similar results have come out of different research programmes. A robust finding is that eating restarts after satiation, when the subject is exposed to palatable food. 76 Rats which maintained a steady weight on monotonous unrestricted 'chow' diets, rose rapidly into obesity when offered a 'supermarket' of appetising foods. Another research programme identified two psychological reactions to food. Eaters were given a 'preload', e.g. a satiating lunch. They were then presented with a rich milkshake or ice-cream. 'Normal' eaters soon lost interest. 'Restrained eaters' started a new cycle of eating. They could be identified in advance by their concern about body weight, and their inclination to diet and binge. Once having overstepped their diets, 'restrained eaters' abandoned restraint altogether. This pattern appears to be pervasive. 78 Although both 'normal' and 'restrained' eating are found at all weight levels, it seems that weight control is more easily attained by not trying too hard. 79 'Restrained' eaters typically turn to food in search of comfort and relief. Food acts as an 'emotional tranquillizer'. 80 Distress is the single most reliable precipitant of a binge. Here again, there is a difference: in response to stress, 'normal' eaters hold intake steady or reduce it, while 'restrained' eaters increase it. 81 In company, people eat more. 82 In everyday settings, a curvilinear power-law relationship was observed between the number of eaters and the size of the meal. An increase from one eater to seven increased meal size from 400 to 700 calories. 'Restrained eaters' were more susceptible to companionship than unrestrained ones. 83 Food prepared professionally, eaten on a special occasion, is likely to be more appetizing. Restaurant food tends to mimic formal bourgeois eating patterns, only more so. Noise, itself a form of stress, stimulates eating, hence perhaps the ubiquity of canned music in restaurants and pubs.
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The disinhibiting effect of stress in the form of appetizing food, distress, and company, forms the link between the micro-motives of individuals, and macrobehavioural patterns. It suggests why Elias and Bourdieu have not been confirmed in their hypothesis that self-control would increase with affluence. The three-meal system was monotonous, regular, predictable, short on stimulation and on novelty. The breakdown of family mealtime routines, expanding food variety and choice, the ubiquity of rich fast foods, and their attendant advertising, exposed increasing numbers to new foods, irregular eating and eating in public places and in company, thus precipitating a shift from 'normal' to disturbed, or aroused, eating patterns. Eating out, with its large portions, 'standard' three course meals, and clean plates, has also challenged restraint. In its turn, this has acted to shift body weight upwards, thus increasing the motivation for self-control, and hence for restrained eating. In their turn, restrained eaters find it more difficult to resist arousal and, as their share of the population increased, weight control became collectively more difficult. 86 Dissatisfaction with weight is the most frequently reported hassle in daily life, and small hassles are good predictors of distress, 87 and hence of eating binges.
From physiology on to society: economic and social status also affects desired body weight, both directly, and more importantly through gender. In poor societies, food is scarce, the poor are thin, and the wealthy are fat. Once these societies were exposed to food abundance, they experienced a sharp rise in weights, and rising levels of obesity. 88 In affluent societies, these conditions persist, and the poor tend to fatness, while the well-off are slimmer. 89 Table 1 compares the relation between obesity, class, and gender in the USA, Europe, and several developing countries. In poor countries, higher income is associated with obesity, for both women and men. In the developed world, there is a strong inverse relation for women. For men, there is an inverse relation in Britain and Europe, but an indeterminate one in the United States. Women's obesity is more strongly determined by socio-economic status than men's. Table 2 indicates that, when average weights under affluence are considered (rather than obesity), the relation of class and weight is mediated by gender. American weight surveys are coy about social class. There is, however, one representative socio-economic breakdown available, of the national health survey of 1971-4, which is compared here with the British one of 1986-7. The gap in time brings the incomes closer together. Table 2 describes the two social extremes in the UK and the USA. American and British men at both social extremes differed very little from each other in BMI. In contrast, affluent, educated women were much thinner than poor women and those with little education. The difference in BMI between lower-and upper-class women was between two and three units.
These weight norms are consistent with the 'handicap principle' in signalling: it is the scarce and costly which is valued. 'Beauty, if it's to be deemed to have any worth, has to be rare.' 92 Under indigence, girth signals wealth and power. Under affluence, it is slimness that is difficult, and demonstrates a capacity for self-control. If self-control is costly, it is more readily available to the well-off than to the poor. 93 American research indicates that economic rewards to slimness are not in terms of direct levels of pay. There was a small penalty for unattractiveness, and a small premium for attractiveness, but these were gender-blind, and the contribution of body weight was not statistically significant. 94 Other studies show a small wage penalty for obesity, affecting women alone. 93 The rewards for body-shape accrued mostly through the competition for mates, a point reluctantly acknowledged by feminist writers. 96 'Physical attractiveness and weight are still the chief and most wholeheartedly sanctioned domains in which women are encouraged to contend with each other.' 97 Female mating competition is more acute than male competition. Women seek men who are typically older, more educated and better off than themselves. 98 The age, the income, and the education pyramids taper towards the top, so there are more female seekers than males sought. Women typically marry men who are two to three years older. 99 But why was it during the period from the 1960s to the 1980s that the 'cult of thinness' re-emerged?
There are several reasons why mating competition, especially among middle-class and educated women, might have intensified during this period. These are associated with a reduction in the supply of eligible males. The 1960s to the 1980s were the decades of massive female entry into higher education and well-paid employment, which reduced the relative number of males with comparable or superior attributes. 101 Women with high education and occupational achievement are less likely to be married. 102 To make things more difficult, between the 1960s and the 1980s, the sex ratio turned strongly against women in the courting age, and they outnumbered considerably the numbers of men two to three years older. 103 This arose as a result of the 'baby boom' cycle. In a sustained period of rising numbers of marriageable people, the older cohorts will be smaller than the younger ones, thus disadvantaging women seeking older mates. Figure 4 shows six different measures of the male/female sex ratio, in a separate cluster for each census year, for the United States and Britain. It In a tlghtcnmg ~~l a t i n g market. hod)-\ \~g h t i v~i one n.dy fur \conlcrl t o coin-
pctc. Tllc mc~gllt LAI-gc.t \ct .it the lo\\. cwd ot'thz rlorrn,ll r'Ingc. A~r i~n c a n women sought a lower weight for themselves than the level that men found attractive. 103 This is consistent with the view that low weight is not desirable in itself, but is rather a credible signal of self-control and virtue. 106 It also suggests why the media-driven 'cult of thinness' found such ready acceptance among the readers of women's magazines. Overweight was often regarded as an advertisement of moral failure: 'my body remains a visible-to-all-the-world sign that I am not in control of my life', wrote Rosemary Green. 'Fat parents are forever a sign of selfindulgence, a perfect example of lack of self-control'. 107 Silverstein and Perlick make a suggestive association of eating disorders, extreme slimming, and the rise in mental health problems with women's labour force competition with men, whom they are driven to emulate in bodily appearance. There is a reasonably good fit between a norm of thin body shapes and the expansion of working opportunities for women in the 1920s and after the 1960s. And the signal of self-control may be as valuable in the labour market as in the mating market. But the stick-thin models in women's magazines are not generally shown as power-dressing, but rather wearing garments of a distinctly feminine character. And while weight norms have decreased, women's weights have increased. Anorexia only affects 1-2 per cent of college-age women, while about one-quarter of all women are obese.
Food has symbolic power, signifying masculinity and femininity, weakness and strength, high and low prestige. 109 Some foods acquire an association with virtue or with moral failing: the self-help slimming movement (like its model Alcoholics Anonymous) has evangelical undertones. 110 Many more women dieted than men, and on the average (comparing BMI outcomes), women succeeded better than men, suggesting that more was at stake for women. that way. 113 Obese women were more likely to be downwardly mobile. 114 In New York in the 1950s, 12 per cent of upwardly mobile women were obese, as compared with 22 per cent of the downwardly mobile, with no comparable trend for men. 115 In a large American study in the 1980s, differences in marriage probabilities and in spouse's earnings accounted for 50-95 per cent of the lower economic status of obese women, and visually unattractive women married less educated men: 'the great majority (as much as 96 per cent) of the economic deficit associated with obesity among women . . . results from differences in the marriage market (especially the probabilities of marriage), not the labor market'. 116 Overweight women were less likely to marry, were poorer, and finished their education earlier than other women, and earlier than men of the same social position."
7 If marital and occupational mobility was denied to the fat, 118 then the poor had even greater obstacles to overcome than the well-off, and with a lower endowment of resources. In a period of accelerated marriage dissolution, mating competition did not end with marriage. 119 Attractive women reported better sex lives and more faithful husbands and lovers. 120 Figure 5 shows that the younger women tended to be thinner than younger men, and how the gap has been closing both with age and over time: women became less competitive as they grew older, and the sex ratio moved in their favour from the 1960s to the 1990s.
During courtship, a woman might have struggled to eat as little as possible. In a permanent relationship, she typically aspired to keep her partner and children well fed.
121 'With cooking you get some appreciation', said a housewife in the 1960s, 'you'll never hear my husband saying the floor looks clean but he'll say he enjoys his food'.
Women claimed more satisfaction from cooking than from any other housework. 123 A well-structured 'proper meal' of meat and two veg. for the whole family (or some ethnic variant thereof) has remained the woman's ideal. 124 Several British surveys found 60-70 per cent of families eating together on most days in the 1980s. 125 In 1987, 'Family mealtimes are more prevalent among younger people, and in the higher social groups. The presence of children in the family is particularly important.' 126 A serious commitment to cooking survived the pressures towards 'convenience' in about a third of households. 127 But convenience was telling. With the decay of the 'three-meal system', by 1982 less than a quarter of British households conformed to the three-meal pattern, while almost half ate only one main meal a day by 1982. 128 In the 1960s, British women spent about two hours a day cooking; by the 1980s, this had fallen by almost 45 minutes (Table 3) . American women were cooking less than British women in the 1960s, and about the same in the 1980s. Some slack was taken up by men, so that the overall decline in cooking time was less; only about ten minutes in America, and twenty in Britain. By the 1980s about the same time was spent cooking in both countries, with women doing about four-fifths of the work. With food, women's mating interests diverged from their nurturing ones. 130 For men, the domestic meal restricted their exposure to food; for women, its preparation prolonged this exposure. Children were inimical to slimness. Pregnancy usually had a lasting effect on body weight. 131 Child-care is stressful, and stress disinhibits eating. Children like sweet and salty flavours, and energy-dense foods. They also react keenly to television advertising of such foods. 132 Giving way to children, women are exposed more strongly to sweet and savoury snacks. 133 'Junk food' is an easy way to silence children, and another is to place them in front of the television. 4 When the two practices are combined, the likelihood of obesity in childhood rises. 135 Metabolic rates decline while children are watching television. 136 When the pressures of home and work mount, one solution is to eat out more, and eating out, as we have seen, is also conducive to more ample eating. 137 The stresses of marriage also disinhibit eating, and eating can become part of implicit bargaining about sexual exchange, signalling availability or withdrawal.
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As body weight began to rise, it stimulated an effort to recapture self-control. As in other dimensions of self-control, those with more at stake, and with more access to resources, have been more successful. Women, with more at stake than men, maintained lower weights; the well-off were more successful than the poor. The repertoire of reactions included food choice, exercise, eating disorders, normative defiance, and acceptance.
If women were driven to slimness by the competition for attractiveness, then, for men, the compelling pressures have been the correlations of animal foods with heart disease. Previously these very foods,-red meat in particular, were associated with manliness, while dairy products, fresh, full-fat milk and butter in particular, were regarded as healthy for children. 139 In the 1950s and the 1960s the correlation between cholesterol and heart disease was discovered, and etched in the public mind. Heart disease at that time was the prime cause of death among males. What followed in the 1970s, in both America and Britain, was a shift in eating habits from richer protein and fatty foods, to foods that were perceived as either 'lighter', or as containing vegetable instead of animal fats. 140 A US Senate committee highlighted correlations between food choice and disease in 1977; the Surgeon General urged a lighter diet, and similar British reports followed soon after. 141 Despite some industry resistance, lighter eating became an official health objective. 142 For the United States, some sense of the changes can be gleaned from a list of'winners' and 'losers', which reflects both the shift to 'lighter' foods (e.g. broccoli, yoghurt), and to more sophisticated ones (e.g. wine, cheese, pasta). Similar changes have occurred in Britain. 143 their sweet tooth.
These changes involved some self-deception. There was a shift from 'heavy' meat (beef, pork, mutton) to 'light' meat, but consumption overall increased substantially. 143 Artificial sweeteners only accounted for about 7 per cent in terms of sugar equivalents. 146 Low-fat 'lite' foods are often almost as high in calories as regular foods. 147 American sales of diet drinks rose from 2 to 12 gallons per year per head, but sugared soft drinks increased from 21 to 40 gallons at the same time . 148 In both the United States and Britain, improvements in the nutritional quality of food have taken place inside the home. 149 In the stable context of the home, learning took place and prudential eating strategies emerged. But increasingly, as we have seen, food is eaten outside the home. The expanding, compelling, novel, and less regular eating environment outside was able to frustrate these strategies. And this food, in the United States, improved much less. It typically contained more of the nutrients overconsumed (fat) and less of those underconsumed (calcium, fibre, and iron). 150 From Britain there is evidence that the prudential task was more difficult for the poor. Specially packaged, palatable 'light foods' tend to be more expensive than the dietary staples, while cheap, low-fat, unsweetened staples such as oatmeal and cabbage take a considerable effort to convert into palatable meals. Poor families found it more difficult to produce balanced diets within their budget constraints. 131 The lower social grades consume junk food' more heavily, e.g. 14 per cent of class AB are 'heavy users' of potato crisps, as against 27 and 30 per cent respectively for classes C2 and D. 132 There are large differences in household consumption, and the well-off spend more than the poor on food, especially on high-cost foods. 133 Body weight is implicated in cancers and heart disease. All of them bear more heavily on the lower social classes, and these classes also tend to consume more tobacco, alcohol, and inferior food. Chancellor of the Exchequer, also wrote a slimming book. Like Mrs Green, he also handed over control to his spouse. 166 These successful dieters both conformed with Ainslie's model of self-control: since available rewards were impossible to resist, their strategy was to surrender food control to an external ally, and to follow strict routines.
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They affected young women mainly, especially in college. 168 Clinical diagnosis is infrequent, but in milder forms these disorders affect substantial numbers. 169 The mating hypothesis of female slimming is supported by a 1980s longitudinal study: female student eating disorders were peaking in the early 20s. Seven or eight years later the women were more likely to be married, heavier, and with fewer eating disorders, although still concerned about body weight. Men had fewer disorders initially, gained more weight subsequently and remained unconcerned about it. 170 Likewise, the convergence of female and male BMIs in the 1990s (Figure 1) is consistent with the rise in male sex ratios during those yean. The ultimate act of body-shaping is cosmetic surgery: in 1996, almost 300,000 fat-sucking operations were carried out in the United States, on 4.4 women for every man. 171 It remains an anomaly that the pursuit of thinness does not seem to have abated, despite the return of sex ratios to parity-but the recent popularity of'working-out' suggests that emphasis has shifted onto 'muscle tone', in which men are more heavily involved than women (Tables 4 and 5) .
Black women were the heaviest of all social groups (Figure 1 ). Among the reasons canvassed are fewer educational and financial resources, low physical activity levels, ineffective dieting, and a rejection of non-black weight norms.
172
This research is inconclusive. Many of these factors would apply to black men as well, but black men have similar BMIs to whites, while black women are two BMI units heavier than white women. 173 Culture is as likely to be a consequence as an independent cause. The sex-ratio explanation of male-female difference may have some purchase here. For black women, sex ratios were much the worst. Black males have been disproportionately absent on military service or in prison, and fell victim excessively to accidents and violence. They achieved less in education than black women. Almost half of multi-person black households are now headed by women. In these circumstances, competition for males has become much less compelling, since the likelihood of marital commitment is reduced. The ratio of the percentage of white to black married men was 76 : 67 in 1970, 70 : 55 in 1980, problems were mastered, new ones appeared. Alcohol is rich in calories, while smoking inhibits appetite. Drinking rose in step with affluence until the 1970s, when it levelled off. Smoking has declined. 183 This pattern is consistent with the rise of body weight. Over a ten-year period in the 1980s, men who quit smoking gained an average 4.4 kg, and women 5.0 kg. They were more than twice as likely to become overweight as non-smokers. 184 New rewards were thrown up by affluence faster than it took to learn to cope with the previous ones, so that overall, despite growing wealth, self-control declined. Obesity shows how abundance, through cheapness, variety, novelty, and choice, could make a mockery of the rational consumer, how it enticed only in order to humiliate. The 'cult of thinness' can be seen as a response to competitive demands on women in mating and the workplace. But its impact on behavioural outcomes was restricted to keeping women's average BMIs below those of men for about two decades; it has not been able to halt the upwards trend of body weight.
